Cornell Law Review
Volume 85
Issue 1 November 1999

Article 5

Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of
Expression outside Churches
Alan Phelps

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alan Phelps, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of Expression outside Churches , 85 Cornell L. Rev. 271 (1999)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol85/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

NOTE
PICKETING AND PRAYER: RESTRICTING
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
OUTSIDE CHURCHES
Alan Phelps
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 272
I. BACKGROUND ........................................... 273

A. Anti-Abortion Protests Move to New Targets ........
B. Cities React to Picketing ............................
1. PrairieVillage, Kansas............................
2. Lincoln, Nebraska ................................
3. Topeka, Kansas ..................................
II.

273
274
275
276
279

COURT METHODOLOGY FOR REVIEW OF RESTRICTIONS ON

ExPREsSION ............................................. 280

A. Standard Public Forum Analysis ....................
1. Content Neutrality ................................
2. Reasonable Time, Place, or Manner Restriction ......
3. Narrow Tailoring................................
B. Free Speech in the Context of Residential
Picketing ...........................................

I.

281
281
282
282
283

CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAw APPEARS ONLY
PARTIALLY APPLICABLE TO CHURCH PICKETING

ORDINANCES ............................................ 286
A. Statutes Prohibiting Disruption of Religious
Services ............................................. 286
B. Cases Dealing with Protests Outside Churches ...... 288

IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAITr OF CHURCH PICKETING BANS:
COMBINING THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS wITH FREE
SPEECH METHODOLOGY .................................. 289

A. The Requirement of Content Neutrality ............
B. The Requirement of an Important Governmental

290

Interest ............................................. 290

1. Protecting Children ............................... 291
2. Protectingthe Right to Worship or "Religious
Privacy"....... ................................. 292
3. Protectinga Captive Audience ..................... 297
C. The Requirement of Ample Alternative Channels ... 301

D. The Requirement of Narrow Tailoring ..............

303

CORNELL LAW REVIEW
V.

[Vol. 85:271

CONSTRUCTING A CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON CHIRCH

PICKETING ..............................................

308

A. Traditional Narrowly Tailored Schemes Appear
Either Ineffective or Undesirable .. *................
B. An Alternative? Preventing Coercion ...............

308
309

CONCLUSION ...................................................

312

INTRODUCTION

Simple yet powerful, picketing is a key form of free speech that
must be both protected and protected against. In recent years, antiabortion protestors have become some of the most vocal and well-organized picketers. The latest battlefields of their continuing crusade
spread beyond the well-trod territory surrounding abortion clinics.
Picketing, protesters have learned, attracts attention. Picketing in areas not known for protests-residential streets, nonmedical businesses, and schools-can attract even more attention. Doctors'
homes bear the brunt of this new wave of picket lines, but a few communities must deal with harassing and coercive protests on less-familiar constitutional ground, such as the sidewalks surrounding
churches.' When protesters target a church the questions that arise
implicate not only where to draw new lines in the sandy dominion
between privacy and speech, but also between speech and constitutional rights such as the freedom of religion. Courts already institute
limits on the First Amendment when it interferes with the enjoyment
of one's physical home; 2 some argue similar restrictions should protect one's spiritual home as well.
Part I of this Note examines reasons why anti-abortion protestors
and other activists target institutions such as churches, and different
communities' attempts to stop this focused picketing. Part II discusses
the Supreme Court's free speech doctrine, focusing on cases involving
targeted picketing outside non-commercial sites, such as doctors' residences. Parts III and IV discuss the inconclusive state of the current
case law as to the question of whether restrictions on church picketing
are constitutional. These sections conclude that, based on indications
from lower courts and an extrapolation of related Supreme Court
cases, such ordinances indeed may pass First Amendment muster as
long as they are narrowly tailored. Finally, Part V cautions that several
of the possible doctrines that potentially justify the expansion of picketing restrictions away from residences could compromise important
free speech values, and presents an alternative.
1
2

See infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
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I
BACKGROUND

A.

Anti-Abortion Protests Move to New Targets

Protesting outside abortion clinics is more difficult today than a
few years ago. Tough federal legislation spurred in part by reports of
violence outside abortion clinics 3 and unfavorable court rulings 4 stymies the aggressive picketing of the past. Reluctant to risk stiff punishments, such as ten years in prison and a $250,000 fine,5 potential
participants in large anti-abortion protests now either stay home or
look for less risky options. 6 Rather than discontinue their mission, the
most ardent protestors increasingly turn their attention away from
clinics to what some call the abortion rights movement's weak link:
the individual doctors who perform such procedures. 7 Protestors now
routinely picket doctors' residences 8 and increasingly focus on aspects
of doctors' lives unrelated to their practice. 9
3 President Clinton signed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE),
Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 3, 108 Stat. 694 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)), into law in
1994. See Ruth Marcus, President Signs Clinic Access Law, Foes File Lawsui WASH. POST, May
27, 1994, at A10. The Act provides for criminal sanctions against anyone who:
[B]y force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from,
obtaining or providing reproductive health services.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (1) (1994); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagementfor Cultural
Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests
(pt. 1), 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 553, 556 (1996) (discussing the constitutionality of FACE).
4 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (upholding a court-imposed buffer zone around an abortion clinic).
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b). The statute provides for jail terms up to 10 years if the
restricted conduct results in bodily injury; for noninjurious conduct the statute provides
terms of up to one year for the first offense and up to three years for subsequent offenses.
6 See Richard A. Serrano, Law ProtectingAbortion Clinics Thwarts Protests, L.A. TiMEs,
Dec. 8, 1996, at Al (describing how anti-abortion protest leaders today "find it increasingly
difficult to recruit volunteers willing to risk violating federal law"). One Florida anti-abortion activist told a newspaper reporter that it was " ' futile to go with a handful of people to
sit down in front of an abortion clinic because you'll be in jail in 20 minutes.'" Andrew
Conte, Shifting Tactics, STUART NEvs/PORT ST. LUCIE NEvs (Stuart, Fla.), Oct. 11, 1998, at
Al, available in LEXIS, News Library (quoting statement of Cliff Beckett). The situation
led that particular protestor to open a traveling counseling service with his wife rather than
continue picketing. See id.
7 See T. Trent Gegax & Lynette Clemetson, The Abortion Wars Come Home, NEvsvEK,
Nov. 9, 1998, at 34.
8 See, e.g., Steven A. Berger, Anti-Abortion Activists Picket Bedford Home of Dr. Goldner,
UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.),Jan. 5, 1998, at Al; Gegax & Clemetson, supra note 7,
at 34; Foes of Abortion Picket Doc's Home, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 5, 1998, at 18.
9 See Mareva Brown, Number of Doctors DoingAbortions Has Fallen Sharply, SAcRAmENro
BEE, Jan. 18, 1998, at All. For example, Troy Newman, an Operation Rescue coordinator
in California, stated: "[Our group] target[s] abortionists to expose them. . . . We follow
them everywhere and tell everyone who cares to listen that they kill children for a living."
Id
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A widespread strategy in this new battlefront is the exposure campaign designed to make life uncomfortable for abortion-providing
doctors and their families. 10 Such tactics range from the relatively
peaceful to outright harassment. Protestors in different communities
have printed wanted posters labeling doctors as child killers, followed
these doctors around town, picketed their homes, disturbed their
neighbors, and in some cases even threatened their children and
spouses." An infamous book by Chicago anti-abortion activistJoseph
Scheidler entitled Closed: 99 Ways to Stop Abortion12 endorses picketing
doctors' homes as a way to warn other abortion-performing doctors of
the risks in providing this service.' 8 Many anti-abortion groups take
Scheidler's advice to heart. In California, protestors blocked the path
of one doctor's car, slashed his tires, picketed his house, held up signs
comparing the doctor to serial killerJeffrey Dahmer, and harassed his
wife at a shopping mall.' 4 A group of Dallas anti-abortion activists organized daily demonstrations in front of a doctor's home, his workplace, his wife's workplace, and the couple's church. 15 The
application of these extreme measures has not escaped the eye of local legislators.
B.

Cities React to Picketing

As anti-abortion protests began to increase in residential areas,
cities quickly started to use existing laws or enact new ones to restrict
such picketing. 16 Courts usually uphold these residential picketing
17
bans unless they appear to restrict protests more than necessary.
1o See, e.g., David G. Savage, Abortion Foes TargetDoctorsfor Harassment,L.A. TimEs, Mar.
14, 1993, at Al (discussing tactics used by anti-abortion protestors).
21
See id.
12

JOSEPH M. SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION (1985).

13 See Roe Versus Wade Plus 25 (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 22, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Transcripts Library, Transcript No. 98012100V34. Scheidler says he has "shut
down a lot of abortion clinics through persuasion." Ial
14 See Benjamin Pimentel, OperationRescue Loses in Court, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1997, at
A19.
15 See Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 671-73 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The protestors
used a telephone hotline to let members of the group know where and when to meet each
day. See id. One protestor rushed at the doctor's wife as she went to get her mail and said,
"'Stop the killing now. Aren't you afraid, Mrs. Tompkins, I'm going to shoot you now?'"
1d. (quoting statement of Tomanek).
16
See, e.g., Dan Luzadder, PanelBacks Limits on Pickets: Measure Aims to Keep Protesters
from Homes, Rocm"MTN. Nvs (Denver, Colo.), Feb. 6, 1997, at 8A; Scott Wade, Law That
Would Ban Picketingat Homes Follows National Lead, COURIER-JOuPNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Mar.
20, 1997, at 2B.
17 SeeAbdon M. Pallasch & David Mendell, Protesters on Fine Line When Target Is a Home:
Policy Shift PushingCity into Rights Debate CHI. TmB., July 26, 1998, § 4, at 1 ("Illinois law
bans pickets outside homes unless those homes double as businesses, and the U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld such bans."). Courts find some such ordinances too broad,
however. See, e.g., Judge Rules Against BangorPicketingLaw, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec.
13, 1996, at 5B ("Bangor's ordinance against targeted residential picketing is unconstitu-
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However, protestors can harass and picket doctors anywhere. Just as
laws protecting abortion clinics merely move the location of the picketing, ordinances creating buffer zones around residences likely will
encourage protestors to find new ground for getting out their
message. These residential ordinances will drive dedicated picketers
to sidewalks of the areas previously thought immune to such tactics.18
1. Prairie Village, Kansas
While many states prohibit physical disruption of church services, 19 the Kansas town of Prairie Village enacted what appears to be
the first challenged ordinance that facially prohibits all picketing
outside both residences and churches. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court
visited the matter in City of PrairieVillage v. Hogan.2 ' In Hogan, police
arrested Theodore T. Hogan on Sunday morning, March 15, 1992 for
picketing "before or about a church. '2 2 Officials observed Hogan
walking a route that twice took him several blocks north and south of
a church on the opposite side of the street.23 Hogan carried with him
a sign expressing anti-abortion text and photographs. 24 He testified
that he chose that particular area for his protest "because it would up
my ante of Christians on their way to and from church," but he also
hoped nonchurchgoers driving along the street would see his
message. 25 The prosecution presented no evidence that Hogan
stopped near the church for any length of time or bothered anyone in
particular, although police said a few people may have crossed the
26
street to avoid Hogan when the police were questioning him.
tional, a judge ruled this week in the case of two anti-abortion protesters who said they
broke the new law in order to test it in court."); Editorial, Protest, Harassment Two Different

Things, OMAuA WORLD HERALD, Feb. 3, 1997, at 14 ("Nebraskans lost some of their legal
protection against harassment when U.S. DistrictJudge Warren Urbom ruled that it's unconstitutional for the state to prohibit protesters from picketing at a person's residence.").
18
See Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 11, 1994), available in 1994 WL
8690168 (discussing one anti-abortion protest group's tactic of picketing doctors wherever
the doctors go). Roy McMillan, a member of the Mississippi group, said he and the others
"want everyone in the state to know the face and the name of the abortionist." Id. In at
least a few communities, protestors have decided to target churches where abortion doctors worship. See Tompkins, 995 F. Supp. at 671-73.
19 See infra Part lI.A.
20
See PRauiuE VILLAGE, KAN., Mut. CODE, tit. 10, ch. 10.04.010 (1992), quoted in City of
Prairie Village v. Hogan, 855 P.2d 949, 950 (Kan. 1993). The ordinance makes it unlawful
for "any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence of any individual in
the city, or before or about any church in the city." City of Prairie Village v. Hogan, 855
P.2d 949, 950 (Kan.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21
855 P.2d 949 (Kan. 1993).
22 Id. at 950.
23
See id. at 951.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26

See i.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

276

[Vol. 85:271

Both a municipal court and state district court found Hogan
guilty and fined him $300.27 Hogan appealed to the Kansas Supreme
Court,2 8 which ruled that any statute must be construed narrowly

when it appears "facially overbroad" and could reach conduct protected by the First Amendment. 29 The court then limited the statute
accordingly, holding that the Prairie Village ordinance banned only
focused picketing in front of a particular residence or church and,
citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Frisby v. Shultz,30
held that merely marching through a neighborhood did not constitute
focused picketing in front of a particular building.3 ' Disagreeing with
a lower court, the Kansas Supreme Court found that Hogan's picket
route did not constitute picketing in front of a particular place under
the ordinance.3 2 Because Hogan was not found in violation of the
ordinance, the court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
3
law.3
2.

Lincoln, Nebraska

A federal district court in Nebraska, however, found itself facing
the question of the constitutionality of such church picketing ordinances. For twenty-two months, a group of Omaha abortion protestors, known as "Rescue the Heartland," targeted a Presbyterian church
in Lincoln where a doctor who performed abortions served as a
church elder.3 Every Sunday between February 1997 and January
1999, a group of six to twelve protestors gathered outside the church
entrances displaying graphic signs and enlarged photographs of
aborted fetuses.3 5 As in Hogan, the local police saw "'nothing that
[they] felt rose to the level of something for instance like terroristic
threats or disturbing the peace.' ' 36 The city's police chief later told
the city council that officers did not personally see anyone being
See id, at 950.
See id.
See id at 952.
30 487 U.S. 474 (1988); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
31 See Hogan, 855 P.2d at 953.
32 See id.
at 954.
33 See id
34 See Aaron Sanderford, In Church's War with Protesters, Both Sides Aim to Protect Children, LINCOLN J. STa, June 29, 1998, at IA. Soon after the court battle described infra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text, the protestors stated they would discontinue the
weekly protests because the doctor no longer performed abortions in Omaha. See Susan
27

28
29

Szalewski, Abortion ProtestsEnd Outside Church, OMAHA WoRLD-HERALD, Jan. 4, 1999, at 11.
35 SeeJoe Duggan, Church Asking City for Help with Anti-Abortion Protestors,LINcoLN J.

STAR, June 20, 1998, at Al; Szalewski, supra note 34.
36 Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1097 (D. Neb. 1998) (quoting Minutes of the Regular Lincoln City Council Meeting Comments DuringPublic Hearingon Amending
Chapter9.20 of the LMC [Lincoln Municipal Code] by Adding a New Section Numbered 9.20.090,
at 36 (Sept. 8, 1998) (comments of Chief of Police Tom Casady)), afd, No. 98-4112NE,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1999).
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chased, blocked, or impeded even during plainclothes patrols of the
37
neighborhood during the weekly demonstrations.
Church members, however, charged that the protestors directed
verbal and visual attacks at children as they entered the church with
their families. One couple said that a protestor walked into the street
while their van stopped for a traffic light, and placed a graphic poster
near the back window of the van where the children sat38 with their
heads down in an attempt to avoid the sight.3 9 Another church member said the protestors regularly would videotape cars driving into the
church parking lot.40 When the member asked a protestor about this

practice, she was told the tapes would be used to look up addresses
from license plate numbers. 4 1 Although the protestors agreed to stay
away from one of the church's entrances, their presence at the entrance to the parking lot continued to create a gauntlet that all the
congregation's children had to pass through. 42 One nine-year-old
child said that a protestor "stuck a bloody baby picture" in front of his
face. 43 "I have had some bad times in my life, but that was the worst,"
he said. 44 At least fifteen families, most with children, eventually left
45
the church because of the picketing.
Ultimately, members of the congregation felt forced to hire an
attorney to lobby the city council for an antipicketing ordinance
designed to protect churches. 4 6 In particular, the churchgoers resented that many of their children were now afraid to attend services.4 7 Church members collected some 3000 signatures supporting
the proposed restriction. 48 The local city council eventually passed
the measure over a mayoral veto and opposition from the city attorney, who stated publicly that in his opinion the ordinance would be
found unconstitutional after an expensive court battle. 4 9 The new ordinance forced picketers carrying signs, banners, and placards to remain across the street from any house of worship in the city "at any
See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
38 See Sanderford, supra note 34. The couple said their daughter asked them why the
family could not go to a different church, one without picketers. See id.
39 See id.; see also Olmer, 23 F. Svpp. 2d at 1097 (discussing the Sunday routine of
.asking... children to remove their seat belts and sit on the floor.., to avoid having them
see the large graphic signs" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40
See Sanderford, supranote 34.
37

41

42
43
1998,
44
45
46

See id.

See id
Fred Knapp, Several Testify at Hearingon PicketingPraposa, LINcoLNJ. STAR, Sept. 9,
at IA.
Id.
See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
See Sanderford, supra note 34.

47

See Duggan, supra note 35.

48
49

See d.
See Ed Russo, Council OverridesJohanns'Veto, INCOtNJ. STAR, Sept. 22, 1998, at IA.

278

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:271

time within the period a half hour before to a half hour" after services. 50 Drafters of the ordinance believed that protestors still could
stand on the sidewalks in front of the church at any time for activities
such as handing out leaflets or conducting direct, one-on-one
conversations. 5 1
50
iaNcoLN, NEB., MuN. CODE § 9.20.090 (1998) (quoted in Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at
1095). This statute provides:
9.20.090 Disturbing the Peace by Focused Picketing at Religious Premises
(a) Definitions. As used in this ordinance, the following terms shall have
the meanings here set forth:
(1) The term "religious premises" shall mean "the property on which is
situated any synagogue, mosque, temple, shrine, church or other structure
regularly used for the exercise of religious beliefs, whether or not those
religious beliefs include recognition of a God or other supreme being";
(2) The term "scheduled religious activity" shall mean "an assembly of five
or more persons for religious worship, wedding, funeral, memorial service,
other sacramental ceremony, religious schooling or religious pageant at a
religious organization's premises, when the time, duration and place of the
assembly is made known to the public, either by a notice published at least
once within 30 days but not less than 3 days before the day of the scheduled
activity in a legal newspaper of general circulation in the city or in the alternative by posting the information in a reasonably conspicuous manner on
the exterior premises for at least 3 days prior to and on the day of the
scheduled activity."
(3) The term "focused picketing" shall mean "the act of one or more persons stationing herself, himself or themselves outside religious premises on
the exterior grounds, or on the sidewalks, streets or other part of the right
of way in the immediate vicinity of religious premises, or moving in a repeated manner past or around religious premises, while displaying a banner, placard, sign or other demonstrative material as a part of their
expressive conduct." The term "focused picketing" shall not include distribution of leaflets or literature.
(b) It shall be deemed an unlawful disturbance of the peace for any person
intentionally or knowingly to engage in focused picketing of a scheduled
religious activity at any time within the period from one-half hour before to
one-half hour after the scheduled activity, at any place (1) on the religious
organization's exterior premises, including its parking lots; or (2) on the
portion of the right of way including any sidewalk on the same side of the
street and adjoining the boundary of the religious premises, including its
parking lots; or (3) on the portion of the right of way adjoining the boundary of the religious premises which is a street or roadway including any
median within such street or roadway; or (4) on any public property within
50 feet of a property boundary line of the religious premises, if an entrance
to the religious organization's building or an entrance to its parking lot is
located on the side of the property bounded by that property line. Notwithstanding the foregoing description of areas where focused picketing is restricted, it is hereby provided that no restriction in this ordinance shall be
deemed to apply to focused picketing on the right of way beyond the curb
line completely across the street from any such religious premises.
Id. (typeface altered).
51 See Russo, supra note 49. The author of the proposal based it on a similar ordinance upheld by a lower court in Topeka, Kansas. SeeJ. Christopher Hain, HearingSet on
Picket Ordinance, LINcoLNJ. STAR, Aug. 18, 1998, at 1A. Apparently the attorney was referring to the Prairie Village, Kansas ordinance, see supra note 20 and accompanying text, that
a lower court upheld and the Kansas State Supreme Court declined to review for
constitutionality.
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Four "Rescue the Heartland" protestors immediately filed a suit
in a federal district court seeking to halt enforcement of the ordinance before it took effect.5 2 United States District Judge Richard
Kopf issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of
the ordinance. 53 On November 4, 1998, Judge Kopf found the ordinance overbroad and granted a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. 54 The Lincoln City Council voted to appeal the injunction
55
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

3.

Topeka, Kansas

In St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc.,5 6 the
plaintiff church sued members of the Westboro Baptist Church under
a nuisance theory, requesting a temporary injunction to enjoin them
from engaging in focused picketing 57 outside St. David's during
scheduled worship sessions, weddings, funerals, and other services. 58
A lower court granted a temporary restraining order ("TRO") largely
adopting the language of St. David's petition. This order restricted
Westboro members from focused picketing within thirty-six feet of the
church property to the east, west, and north, and within 215 feet of
church property on the south, starting one half hour before and ending one half hour after a "religious event."59 The Westboro members
continued picketing without their customary signs, 60 and the lower

court amended the TRO to cover focused picketing "with or without
banner[s], placard[s], or sign[s]." 61 The Kansas Court of Appeals
52 See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. Three of the protestors testified that they never
knowingly harassed or intimidated anyone. See id.
at 1096. With the city attorney unavailable to defend the ordinance because of his public statements, the city hired a local firm
and accepted an offer of pro bono assistance from the Washington, D.C. office of Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering. See Ed Russo, 2 Firms to Defend City in Picket Suit, INCOLNJ. STAR,Sept.
29, 1998, at IA.
53 See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
54 See id. at 1094.
55 See Mark Andersen, Council to Appeal Picketing Ruling, LiNcoLN J. STAR, Nov. 17,
1998, at 1A. Whether the city will continue the legal battle now that the protest has
stopped remains to be seen. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, 2-1,Judge Kopf's injunction just
as this Note was going to press. See Olmer v. City of Lincoln, No. 98-4112NE, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1999). Time constraints do not permit a full analysis
of the circuit court's decision here, but the majority opinion and the dissent provide interesting, real-world examples of some of the arguments discussed more fully in Part IV.
56 921 P.2d 821 (Kan. Ct. App.), review denied, 260 Kan. 995 (1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1090 (1997).
57

In their petition, St. David's defined "focused picketing as 'standing, sitting or walk-

ing at a deliberately slow speed or walking repeatedly around Plaintiff's house of worship
by any person governed by the order, while carrying a banner, placard or sign.'" Id. at 824.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 825.
60 See id. at 825-26.
61 Id. at 826.
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later ruled that this TRO "ripened into a temporary injunction, 62
which Westboro appealed.
The St. David'scourt viewed the evidence in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff to decide if the church would have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits. 63 The court deliberately refused to

reach the issue of whether Westboro's speech was constitutionally pro65
tected" and ruled in favor of St. David's to affirm the buffer zone.
Both the Kansas Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
66
Court declined to review the decision.
These three cases-Hogan, Olmer, and St. David's-provide an
idea of how a ban on picketing outside churches might fare if a court
were to examine it fully. In Hogan, the court avoided the constitutional issue, but stressed narrow construction of the restrictive ordinance. The Olmer court held that challenges to a similar ordinance
would have a substantial likelihood of success, while the court in St.
David's upheld a judge-instituted ban targeting a specific group of
picketers. To understand these interpretations and to predict what
other courts might do in similar situations, it is best to begin with the
basic tenets of free speech law.
II
COURT METHODOLOGY FOR REVIEW OF RESTRICTIONS
ON EXPRESSION

The emphasis placed on freedom of speech in this country makes
the First Amendment a hotly debated topic in many contexts. The
First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law
6 7 But, as with any general rule,
... abridging the freedom of speech."
courts recognize exceptions. For instance, the proverbial prankster
who enjoys yelling about fires in theaters lacks constitutional protec69
tion,68 as does the ruffian who threatens others with violence.
In the case of relatively peaceful picketing, courts first pay attention to the location protestors choose to deliver their message rather
than the message itself. "There is no doubt that as a general matter
peaceful picketing... [is] expressive activity involving 'speech' pro62

i. at 827.

63

See id

64

See id. at 832.

65 See id
66 See St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 260 Kan. 995
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997).

amend. I.
See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 749 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Holmes's famous hypothetical).
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (dictum) (stating that a statute
69
making a threat against the President a crime is constitutional as long as it is interpreted
with an eye to the limitations of the First Amendment).
67
68

U.S. CONST.
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tected by the First Amendment," 70 but not all speech is protected in
all places.
A.

Standard Public Forum Analysis

The doctrine surrounding First Amendment challenges to speech
restrictions is well-established, though sometimes difficult to apply in
practice.7 1 As an initial matter, courts ask whether the site of the
speech is a public forum where speech receives the most deference, a
"limited" public forum open only to certain types of speech, or a nonpublic forum where speech may be restricted. 72 The Supreme Court
considers streets, parks, and sidewalks-whether near a church or
not-to be "quintessential public forums." 73 From "'[T]ime out of
mind' public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly
and debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public forum."7 4 In such
paradigmatic public forums, government regulations impacting expression must meet several requirements. First, the restriction must
75
be content-neutral to avoid facing nearly always-fatal strict scrutiny.
Second, the regulation must be a reasonable time, place, or manner
restriction that serves an important governmental interest without
closing alternative channels for the expression.7 6 Third, the regula77
tion must be narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest.
1.

Content Neutrality

To demonstrate content neutrality, the government must show
that its restriction can be "justifiedwithout reference to the content of
the regulated speech."78 The relevant test is whether the government
"adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys. The government's purposeis the controlling conUnited States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).
See generally Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-FromSidewalks to Cyberspace,
58 OHIo ST. LJ. 1535, 1535-55 (1998) (reviewing the history of the public forum doctrine).
72
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-48 (1983).
For a critical analysis of whether these distinctions provide the best way to address First
Amendment questions, see C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashingof the Public Forum:Problems in
First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 109, 110 (1986) (arguing that the pigeonholing of cases into specific, outcome determinative fora unnecessarily undermines the
careful weighing of competing speech and public interests).
73 PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
74 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (quoting Peny Educ. Ass'h, 460 U.S. at
45).
75 See Peny Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
76 See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
648 (1981).
77 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
78 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70

71
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sideration." 79 Even if a restriction tends to affect some speakers more
than others, the Constitution requires nothing more than a content80
neutral governmental purpose.
2.

Reasonable Time, Place, or Manner Restriction

Once restriction on expression passes the content neutrality test,
the government must show that it serves a significant governmental
8
interest while leaving open ample alternative channels for speech. '
Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions give government the
power to control disruption in public areas so long as this control
does not tread heavily on speech rights.
Courts recognize a variety of significant governmental interests as
constitutionally permissible bases of time, place, or manner restrictions. For example, the Supreme Court considers the orderly movement of large crowds about a fairground, 8 2 the maintenance of
attractive city parks, 83 the smooth flow of traffic on busy streets, 84 and
the freedom of neighborhoods from over-amplified noises8 5 as substantial governmental interests to justify the restriction of speech.
While the analysis is heavily fact-specific, a general theme of protecting "the safety and convenience" of citizens in public places emerges
from these holdings.

86

The government also must show that ample alternative channels
of expression remain in spite of the restriction. An alternative channel for expression could entail moving the speech to a nearby, less
obtrusive location or allowing the speaker to stay in the area, but to
communicate in other ways. If the speaker still can reach the selected
target audience through the alternative channel, a court will usually
87
find that ample channels exist.
3.

Narrow Tailoring

Although a regulation "must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests[,] .

.

. it need not

be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so."8 As long
as the means chosen by the government "are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government's interest,

. . .

the regula-

79

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

80

See id

81
82
83
84

See Hefron, 452 U.S. at 647-48.
See id. at 651.
See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984).
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id at 654-55.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989).

85
86
87

88
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tion will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speechrestrictive alternative." 9 In practice, predicting whether a restriction
will be found substantially broader than necessary is difficult because
of the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. Courts examining such ordinances consider a variety of issues, such as the types of communication banned, and the times of day and geographical areas in which
speech is restricted.
B.

Free Speech in the Context of Residential Picketing

In Frisby v. Schultz,90 the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance
designed to stop anti-abortion harassment by prohibiting picketing
outside private residences. 9' Controversial picketing outside the
Brookfield, Wisconsin home of a doctor who performed abortions
prompted the ordinance. Over the course of one month, groups of
eleven to forty protestors picketed six times outside the doctor's
home.9 2 Although the picketers did not violate local rules prohibiting
disorderly conduct and loud noises, neighborhood's complaints led
the town board to take action. 93 Aware that any exceptions might
doom the ordinance for lack of content neutrality, the town leaders
passed a relatively broad restriction outlawing any "picketing before
or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of
Brookfield." 94 The ordinance stated that Brookfield residents "enjoy
in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and
privacy" that ought to be protected and preserved from picketing that
"causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants... [and]
95
has as its object the harassing of such occupants."
Demonstrators filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 after officials notified them that further protests would lead to
enforcement of the new ordinance. 9 6 Subsequently, the district court
held that the ordinance did not meet the narrow tailoring require89 Id.at 800. When reviewing injunctions, a more rigorous standard applies, as the
Supreme Court explained in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765
(1994). Concerned that injunctions might have a more discriminatory potential than statutes, the Court moved beyond mere intermediate scrutiny and declared an injunction
must "burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest."
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
90
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
91
See id. at 488.
92 See id.at 476.
93
94
95

See id.
Id.at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted)
Id. (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

96

See id
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ments for public forum restrictions.9 7 This decision was eventually affirmed by a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, 98 and then was appealed to the Supreme Court,99
which granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the issue' 0 0 began by noting that
any picketing restriction must be subjected to "careful scrutiny," but
that "'[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places
and at all times."' u"'
The Court quickly dispatched the Town of
Brookfield's argument that its narrow, residential streets could not be
characterized within the standard definition of a public forum. 10 2 Justice O'Connor wrote, "No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary... [for streets] held in the public
trust [to be] properly considered traditional public fora."' 0 3 Thus,
any picketing ordinance must meet the Court's "stringent standards" 10 4 for speech restrictions outlined in cases such as Peny.1 5
As the Brookfield town leaders anticipated, the Court held the
broad language of the ordinance content-neutral. 0 6 The Court then
considered whether the ordinance met the Perry test under which it
must be (1) narrowly tailored to (2) serve a significant governmental
interest and (3) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. The Court's response to each of these factors deserves mention.
Starting with the alternative channels requirement, the Court distinguished its analysis from those of the lower courts by insisting on a
narrow view of the ordinance's scope. Rather than characterizing the
ordinance as banning all picketing in residential areas, the Court focused on the ordinance's language and use of the singular forms of
"residence" and "dwelling.' u0 7 According to the Court, this choice of
words suggested "that the ordinance is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and taking place in front of, a particular residence." 0 8 Thus, protestors remained able to communicate their
message with "[g]eneral marching through residential neighbor97

See Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985), af/'d en banc, 822 F.2d 642

(7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
98 See Schultz v. Frisby, 822 F.2d 642 (1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
99
See Frisby v. Schultz, 484 U.S. 1003 (1988) (postponing the further consideration of
jurisdictional question until "the hearing of the case on the merits").
100 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion.
101 Id. at 479 (alterations in original) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985)).
102
See id. at 480.
103 Id.at 481
104

Id.

105

See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.

106
107,

108

See id
Id.
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hoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of
houses." 10 9 The Court determined that ample channels of protest remained open, because the ordinance only foreclosed focused
picketing." 0
Next, the Court agreed that governments have an interest in protecting the tranquillity and privacy of the home-the unique "'last
citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.'""' The Court relied on a
line of cases that held that the government can protect unwilling re112
cipients of a message while inside of their homes.
Lastly, the Court considered whether the ordinance actually
targeted more activity than what it sought to eliminate and thus violated narrow tailoring principles. A complete ban of a particular expressive activity may be permissible, the Court wrote, if the "'medium
of expression itself'" rather than a byproduct of that communication
offends the governmental interest." 3 Applying this to Brookfield, the
Court contended that the focused picketing did not "seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted
resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way.""14 Furthermore,
the Court wrote, the target of such an "offensive and disturbing...
form of... communication... is figuratively, and perhaps literally,
trapped within the home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picketing is left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech" as might be possible away from the home. 115 The
109

Id. at 483.

110 See id. at 484. The Court agreed with the Town that the ordinance would permit
protestors to enter neighborhoods in groups, to go door-to-door explaining their views, to
distribute literature through the mail, and to call residents on the telephone. See id.
I11 Id. (quoting Gregoryv. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
112 According to the Court, there "is
no right to force speech into the home of an
unwilling listener." Id. at 485. The Court cited FCC v. Pacqfica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (holding that offensive radio broadcasts are not protected speech), Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (holding that soundtrucks broadcasting at unreasonably loud volumes
in residential neighborhoods are not protected speech), Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (holding a complete ban on door-to-door solicitation invalid, but noting that homeowners who indicate an unwillingness to be disturbed could still be protected from intrusion), and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding that a municipality's duty to
maintain the smooth flow of traffic through its streets permitted it to restrict the distribution of handbills on the streets and sidewalks in support of this decision). In all of these
cases, however, messages enter the home more invasively than the apparently peaceful
Brookfield picketing. Handbilling involves someone actually entering the homeowner's
property. Radio broadcasts go directly into the unwilling listener's living room. Obnoxious sound trucks spitting advertisements at high volume could be nearly impossible to
ignore. While potentially as harassing as any of these other examples, picketing also can be
easy to shut out as long as the protestors remain relatively quiet.
113 Frisby,487 U.S. at 486 (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
810 (1984) (upholding a local ordinance banning all signs on public property in order to
reduce visual clutter and blight)).
114 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
115 Id- at 487.
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Court thus held that the First Amendment allowed Brookfield to protect this "captive audience" by completely banning this intrusive
6
speech."
By denying certiorari in Lawson v. Murray," 7 the Supreme Court
recently rejected a challenge to an even broader injunction issued to
protect the home of a New Jersey doctor who performs abortions.
The Court let stand a restriction that prohibited protestors from demonstrating on the street along Murray's property line, about eighty
feet from the house, and limited protesting beyond that point to fifteen
persons for one hour every two weeks, provided that the protestors
give police twenty-four-hour advance notice." 8 Although Justice
Scalia concurred in the denial of certiorari on separate grounds, he
condemned the injunction as "a mockery of First Amendment law."" 9
Justice Scalia wrote that the lower court's reliance on the "captive audience" exception "may make it difficult to reach the most significant
question the case presents: whether prior restraint of speech may be
20
imposed in absence of actual or threatened illegality."'
In the case of the residential castle, it appears that even the relatively peaceful picket is too much of an imposition for captive homedwellers to bear. The question that remains open is whether this
strong protective impulse translates to protections of other facets of
life farther from home.
III
CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW APPEARS ONLY
PARTIALLY APPLICABLE TO CHURCH

PICKETING ORDINANCES
A.

Statutes Prohibiting Disruption of Religious Services

Although only a few ordinances restrict picketing outside
churches to the degree seen in Olmer or Hogan, many states have laws
banning the disruption of funerals 121 or the disturbance of religious
services. 122 Most of these ordinances are broad and could be read to
116

I& at 487-88.

117
118

119 S. Ct. 387 (1998).
See i& at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring).

119

Id

120 Id.
121 See, e.g., MAss. ANN.LAWs ch. 272, § 42 (Law. Co-op. 1998) ("Whoever wilfully interrupts or... in any way disturbs a funeral assembly or procession shall be punished.");
OKl. STAT. tit. 21, § 1166 (1997) (stating that anyone who "disturbs, interrupts or disquiets" a funeral assemblage is guilty of a misdemeanor).
122 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 302(a) (West 1997) (providing for a fine up to $1000
for anyone who "intentionally disturbs or disquiets any assemblage of people met for religious worship at a tax-exempt place of worship"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (Consol. 1998)
(providing that anyone "who makes unreasonable noise or disturbance" within 100 feet of
a religious service is guilty of aggravated disorderly conduct); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
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encompass picketing outside churches, even when such picketing is
relatively peaceful. For instance, the commonly used term disturb
means "[t] o throw into disorder; to move from a state of rest or regular order; to interrupt a settled state of; to throw out of course or
order.' 23 "Disturbance of public or religious worship" has been defined as "[a]ny acts or conduct which interfere with the peace and
good order of an assembly of persons lawfully met together for religious exercises." 124 In Riley v. Districtof Columbia,125 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a statute that outlawed the
disturbance of congregations engaged in religious exercise against a
charge of vagueness. The court held that "'disturb' is a word in common use and has an ordinary meaning which is easily understood by
persons of reasonable intelligence."'1 2 6 Churchgoers in Lincoln likely
would contend that the Olmer picket at the very least interrupted the
settled state of their congregation and interfered with the good order
of their assembly, even if much of the disturbance occurred outside
the church itself.
The few court cases dealing with religious service and funeral disruption ordinances focus on protestors who actually entered a church
during or shortly after services.12 7 However, some of these holdings
also include broad language that may apply to pre- or post-service disturbance. For example, in Hill v. State128 an Alabama court held that a
law forbidding disturbance of religious worship applied even when
services had concluded and members were leaving:129 "[T]here is
generally an assemblage of the worshippers before the services commence, and the assemblage continues for a reasonable time after the
130
... services terminate ....
Although this language offers supporters of an Olmer-style ordinance some ground to argue that freedom of expression around a
church may be subject to special limits, police guarding the church in
Hill did not arrest the defendant until he actually entered the building, placard in hand.' 3 ' In contrast, nowhere in Olmer is it alleged
288.4(a) (7) (1997) (stating that anyone who "engages in conduct which disturbs the peace
or order at any religious service" commits unlawful disorderly conduct);.
123
BLAcK's LW DiaToNARY 476 (6th ed. 1990).
124
Id. at 477.
125 283 A.2d 819 (D.C. 1971).
126
Id. at 822.
127 See, e.g, State v. Olson, 178 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Minn. 1970) (upholding conviction
of the defendant for disrupting a church service under a statute proscribing the disturbance of another's "peace and quiet" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128
381 So. 2d 206 (Ala. Grim. App. 1979).
129
See id. at 212.
130
Id.
131

See id at 209.
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that picketers entered the church or even that the picketing could be
heard or seen from within the church walls.
B.

Cases Dealing with Protests Outside Churches

Many of the cases dealing with church protests are distinguishable from Olmer and St. David's. In Olivieri v. Ward,132 the Second Circuit upheld a police order preventing gay rights protestors from
demonstrating directly in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York
City during the annual Gay Pride March, but allowing the demonstrators to picket on an adjacent street. 133 The court held that the temporary clearing of the church sidewalk was a reasonable time, place, or
manner restriction, 3 4 given the size of the demonstration, the potential for violence due to the event's history, and the nearby counterdemonstration planned by anti-gay protestors. 3 5 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the side street option gave the demonstrators
ample alternative channels for their communication. 13 6 Because this
case dealt with a large demonstration and only a temporary speech
restriction, it is easily distinguishable from the Olmer statute, which
involved a permanent restriction applied to small groups without a
local history of violence.
In another church picketing case, Action v. Gannon,'37 the Eighth
Circuit held that protestors could not demonstrate inside a cathedral,
but that they had the right "to engage in peaceful pamphleteering
and picketing on public property.., provided, of course, that they do
not interfere with those entering or leaving the church." 3 8 Arguably
dicta, it is difficult to know what the Action court meant by interfere.
This case involved protestors who, on numerous occasions, entered a
church with the intention and effect of disrupting and actually halting
services. 139
In Tompkins v. Cyr,14° a federal district court in Texas examined a
request for an injunction prohibiting protests outside the home of a
beleaguered doctor and his wife who had been the focus of protests at
several locations, including their church. In restricting the protestors,
the court criticized their activity outside the church:
The Court is troubled by the notion that a person may be subjected to focused picketing at their place of worship. Indeed, the
132

133
134
135
136
'37
138
'39
140

766 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1985)
See id. at 691.
See id. at 694.
See i&

See id.
450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1232-33.
See idat 1229-31.
995 F.Supp.664, 671-73 (N.D.Tex. 1998)
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right to engage in quiet and reflective prayer without being subjected to unwarranted intrusion is an essential component of freedom of religion. The government certainly has a significant interest
in protecting this important First Amendment right. However,
14 1
neither party has briefed or argued this constitutional issue.
Although this language provides support for the proposition that the
government has a legitimate interest in protecting areas surrounding
churches, 142 it is only dicta.
In Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara,14 3 two "sidewalk counselors"
opposed to abortion challenged a city ordinance that barred demonstrations within eight feet of entrances to medical clinics and houses
of worship (the "driveway" provisions) or within a moving eight-foot
"bubble" surrounding approaching and departing patients or worshipers within 100 feet of such entrances.'4 While the district court
enjoined enforcement of the ordinance except for the "bubble zone,"
the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld only the "driveway" provision
for both clinics and churches.' 4 5 In that case, however, the governmental interest focused on parishioners' physical access to
churches. 146 A small eight-foot buffer zone allows both access to a
doorway as well as nearly every form of communication, including
conversation. The Edwards ordinance did not prohibit signs or any
gatherings outside the narrow eight-foot zone, differentiating itself
147
from the more wide-sweeping ban seen in Olmer.
IV

THE CONSTrrUTIONALr=Y OF CHURC PICEmrNG BANS:
CommINING THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS wrrH
FREE SPEECH METHODOLOGY

In the absence of case law dealing directly with the question of
whether ordinances or injunctions banning picketing outside a
church are constitutional, the best guides are Olmer, St. David's, and
Supreme Court cases such as Frisby. The next section gives an analysis
of picketing restrictions in light of these cases and the First Amendment doctrine described above.
141
142

Id at 681 n.10.

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
150 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1142 (1999).
144 Id. at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 See id. at 1216-17.
147 In an older New York state court decision, Abyssinian Baptist Church of New York v.
African NationalistMovement 71 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947), the court granted a preliminary injunction against Sunday church picketing on the grounds that it "tends to a
breach of the peace and the sanctity of the day and holy places of assembly and worship."
Id. at 93. However, the court's reliance on the Book of Exodus as its sole authority for this
proposition, see id., limits the precedential value of the holding.
'43
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The Requirement of Content Neutrality

Like the broad ordinance passed by Brookfield and upheld in
Frisby,148 total restrictions on church picketing appear to pass the content-neutrality gauntlet. On its face, such a measure simply bans all
types of focused protests regardless of the message conveyed, perhaps
subject to specific time periods.
For example, the St. David'scourt quickly decided the injunction
before it met the test of content neutrality. Quoting the command
from Madsen that "'the government's purpose [is] the threshold consideration,"' the St. David's court held that the express purpose of the
injunction was to prevent potential violence between Westboro and St.
David's members as occurred during previous encounters. 49 This
consideration, the court said, was not viewpoint based.' 50
The Olmer opinion notes that content neutrality can be determined by evidence showing that officials passed an ordinance in response to specific protestors outside a particular church. 15 1 Such
concerns are beyond the scope of this Note which discusses such ordinances in a more general sense and assumes no content-based motives
on the part of the legislative decision maker. Given no ulterior motives, an outright ban on all types of picketing in front of any place of
worship appears to be content neutral. Such a ban requires no inquiry into the nature or substance of the restricted speech.
B.

The Requirement of an Important Governmental Interest

The promulgation of a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction also requires a constitutionally important governmental interest.
Both the Lincoln ordinance and the Kansas injunction cite two potenSee supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821, 829
(Kan. Ct App. 1996) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763
(1994)).
150 See St. David's, 921 P.2d at 829.
151
'hile finding the ordinance content-neutral for the purposes of the preliminary
injunction, the Olmer court noted:
There is evidence in the record that the ordinance at issue was written by
the attorney for the Westminster Presbyterian Church; that the attorney, on
the church's behalf, was attempting to target and regulate demonstrators
who carry anti-abortion signs outside of that particular church; and that the
ordinance was drafted broadly for strategic purposes in order to avoid perceived constitutional difficulties.... [A] plausible argument can be made
that the ordinance's facial content-neutrality is but a pretext for siding with
a large and influential church to the detriment of a few protestors ....
Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1099 (D. Neb. 1988) (footnotes omitted),
affd No. 98-4112NE, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct 17, 1999). The court's
reasoning presents an interesting problem for other legislative bodies in similar situations.
How can legislators assure courts that their facially neutral regulations are in fact neutral
even when passed entirely at the insistence of the targets of a specific protest?
148

149
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tially legitimate governmental interests: protecting children and protecting the right to worship.
1. Protecting Children
The district court in Olmer held that the main governmental interest at stake was "protecting very young children from being forced to
view extremely graphic and quite disturbing images upon their entrance to, or exit from, church." 152 The court found this interest in
protecting children from gruesome signs to be significant, 153 a point
54
the plaintiff protestors conceded.
Like the Olmer court, the St. David's court wrestled with the issue
of whether the protestors' verbal and visual speech barrage deserved
less constitutional protection because children were routinely a part
of the target audience.' 55 The court noted the Supreme Court's holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'5 6 that speech delivered to homes
through radio broadcasts was "uniquely accessible to children" in contrast to forms of expression that can be withheld from children without restricting access to adults. 157 Comparing the audience in the
case before it to that in Pacifica, the St. David's court explained that
adding children to the mix changed the language that Westboro picketers lawfully could use. 158 "Importantly, as in [Pacifica], the audience
cannot be otherwise separated out so that the children are not subject
to the objectionable speech, absent requiring the children to remain
home, which would be an obvious assault upon their free exercise of
religion." 159 The St. David's court also reasoned that, as with messages
transmitted via broadcast media, church picketing confronts citizens
in both a public and private sphere-public space must be traversed
to get to the church, and actually engaging in worship is a private
0
activity. 16
Although both the Olmer and St. David's courts came to the conclusion that protecting children from gruesome language could be an
important governmental interest, the interest is a problematic one.
While the urge to protect children is strong and understandable, complete protection of a group nearly ubiquitous in society requires simi152

Id.

153

See id. at 1100. The court cited, among other cases, Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("[T]here is a compelling interest in protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors.").
154 See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
155 See St. David's, 921 P.2d at 830-31.
156 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding an FCC order condemning radio station that

broadcast comedian's monologue entitled "Filthy Words").
157 St. David's, 921 P.2d at 831 (quoting Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749).
158
159
160

See id.

I&
See id
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larly ubiquitous restrictions that sanitize language everywhere. The
Supreme Court recognized this concern in Bolger v. Youngs DrugProducts Corp.161 In Bolger, the court struck down a federal statute outlaw62
ing the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements.
Noting that Pacifica's special governmental interest in regulating
broadcast media "does not readily translate into ajustification for regulation of other means of communication,"' 63 the Court declared that
"[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited
to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."' 64 Most recently, the

Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU

65

applied strict scrutiny to an In-

ternet antipornography measure designed to protect children. The
Court found that the medium featured neither the invasive nature
1 66
nor the spectrum scarcity attributed to broadcasting in Pacifica.
One could argue with the St. David's court by saying that gruesome pictures outside a church that children must attend constitute a
medium just as invasive as broadcasting. However, it is important to
remember that Pacifica and Reno involved protecting children from
obscene speech, not the political protest speech in question as in St.
David'' 67 In Ginsberg v. New York, 168 the Supreme Court held that
material not obscene for adults could still be obscene and restricted as
to minors. The GinsbergCourt, however, made clear that such material could not be kept from adults, even noting that the challenged
69
statute allowed parents to acquire the material for their children.1
Therefore, an ordinance simply banning all gruesome speech outside
a church would impermissibly restrict both children's and adults' access to the material.
2.

Protectingthe Right to Worship or "ReligiousPrivacy"

Another potential governmental interest involves protecting the
right of citizens to worship without undue interference. For example,
the Lincoln ordinance provides that it "is intended only to prohibit a
certain specified form of disturbance of the peace which arises when
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

463 U.S. 60 (1983).
See id. at 75.
Id. at

74.

Id.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
See i. at 868-70.
Obscene material is generally held to appeal to the prurient interest in nudity, sex,
or excretion. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (1980). Although they may be distasteful
or perhaps even shocking, the sort of images described in Olmer and St. David's do not
meet the legal definition of obscenity.
168
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
169
See id. at 639. For a discussion of various attempts to protect children from obscenity, see Note, The Cyberworld CannotBe Confined to Speech That Would Be Suitablefor a Sandbox,
29 SETON HALL L. Rxv. 286 (1998).
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one form of expressive conduct, focused picketing, tends to override
another form of expressive conduct, namely the free exercise of religion."1 70 The St. David's decision also mentioned other governmental
interests such as "ensuring the public safety and order," "promoting
the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks," protecting
"property rights" and the "right to worship one's religion without
71
infringement."'
The same First Amendment that keeps expression free from governmental interference also protects citizens from any abridgment of
the free exercise of their religion.' 72 Although there is no state action
prohibiting free exercise of religion in the case of a private group
picketing a church, in some contexts government inaction has the effect of subordinating one right to another. As the Supreme Court
wrote in Kovacs v. Cooper,173 "[t]o enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary."' 74 If the
government did nothing to stop private interference with the exercise
of constitutional rights, those rights would be worthless. 175 For example, courts have held that the free exercise of religion does not in17 6
clude the freedom to destroy the religious activities of another.
Free speech is also subjugated to a defendant's right to a fair trial by
limiting pretrial prejudicial statements.' 77 As seen in Frisby, the government has a further interest in protecting privacy in that "'last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick"'-the home.' 78 These same
words could easily apply as well to churches, long sanctuaries for those
weary, tired, and sick both physically and spiritually. In fact, these
words were originally found in justice Black's concurrence in Gregory
v. City of Chicago,17 9 which notes that buildings besides homes, such as
schools, courthouses, libraries, and hospitals, require peace and
quiet.' 8 0 Similarly, one can argue that churches carry an inherent
170 Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1096 (D. Neb. 1998) (quoting Lincoln, Neb., Ordinance 17413 § ICC) (Sept. 21, 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
afj'd, No. 98-4112NE, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1999).
171 St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821, 82930 (Kan.Ct. App. 1996).
172 "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
173 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
174

Id. at 88.

175 See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagementfor Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct,
Unprotected Speech, and ProtectedExpression in Anti-Abortion Protests-Section I, 29 U.C. DAVis
L. REv. 1163, 1203-1213 (1996) (arguing that speech may be limited to protect other constitutional rights).
176 See Hill v. State, 381 So. 2d 206 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979).
177 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-63 (1966).
178 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J.,concurring)).
179 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
180 See id. at 118 (Black, J., concurring).
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sanctity that approaches close to that of the home, perhaps even surpassing it in the minds of many churchgoers.
While examining the governmental interest in protecting
churches from undue disturbances, the St. David's court noted the
concern in Frisby and Madsen for residential privacy. 811 The court also
reflected on the holding of the Madsen Court that the government has
a significant interest in protecting a clinic's property from focused
picketing because it "threaten [ed] both the psychological and physical well-being of a [reproductive] clinic's patients." 182 The St. David's
court then agreed with the Kansas trial court that one has the right to
worship in a peaceful environment, be it one's home or one's house
of worship.1 8 3 Based on this reasoning, the St. David's court found
that "in addition to the government interest in protecting residential
and clinical privacy, the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of one's place of worship.' u8 4 This right, the court
said, does not flow from the free exercise clauses of either the federal
or Kansas state constitutions, since both prohibit government action
interfering with religious conduct. Rather, "the right of free exercise
would be a hollow one if the government could not step in to safeguard that right from unreasonable interference from another private
85
party."'
Defending this conclusion, the St. David's court wrote that the
Supreme Court has held that "'religious worship may not be disturbed
by those anxious to preach a doctrine of atheism."" a8 6 The court then
took the leap necessary to apply such cases to the situation before it:
"More broadly stated[,] ... one's religious worship may not be unduly
disturbed by another anxious to preach a different religious or social
philosophy." 8 7 As this Note points out, 8 8 one person's disturbance
might be another's minor inconvenience. However, demonstrations
that actually drive families away from a particular church, as in Olmer,
are arguably undue disturbances.
The other religion-based mandate in the First Amendment, the
Establishment Clause, creates another hurdle that a court must clear
before it could declare religious privacy a significant governmental interest.18 9 Special restrictions on public areas near churches might
181
See St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821,
830 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
182 Id
183 See i&d
184 Id
185 I&
186 Id (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949)).
187 IM (emphasis added)
188 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
189 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .
" U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court found the Establishment Clause applicable to the
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suggest the imprimatur of a government favoring religious worship, a
chink in the so-called "wall"'g between church and state.
Lemon v. Kurtzman'9 1 articulates the Supreme Court's three-part
methodology for determining whether a governmental action violates
the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' 1 92 In a series of later decisions the Court modified the secular-effect prong into
an endorsement test, 193 which held unconstitutional governmental actions that, considering the totality of the circumstances, create in a
reasonable person the perception that the state endorses or disapproves of religion. 194 Although its precise contours became uncertain
after the Court's splintered decision in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,195 the endorsement test still remains a part of the
Establishment Clause doctrine. Lemon and its progeny thus present an
obvious and confusing conflict between the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, because any governmental act that protects
the free exercise of religion necessarily advances religion in some
19 6
way.
A picketing ban that seeks to minimize harassment around
churches seems to meet the first part of the Lemon test. Protecting a
constitutional right is a secular purpose, even if that right involves religion. This case differs from those in which the Court has found no
secular purpose, such as those involving state laws mandating that all
classrooms post a copy of the Ten Commandments, 197 requiring
states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
190 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citation
omitted). Although Justice Scalia likened the Lemon test to a horror-movie "ghoul," in191

192

voked or ignored at the whim of the Court, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring), the Court has never
overruled it.
193 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 669, 688-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194 See County of Allegeny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 597 (Blackmun, J.).
195 515 U.S. 753 (1995). A plurality opinion by Justice Scalia instituted a per se rule,
holding that privately funded religious speech in a state-owned but genuinely public forum
does not violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 770 (Scalia, J.); see also David Goldberger, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette: Beware ofJustice Scalia'sPer Se
Rule, 6 GEo. MASON L. Ray. 1 (1997) (reviewing Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
arguing againstJustice Scalia's position in Pinette).
196 SeeWalz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (noting that either of religion
clauses, "if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other").
197 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
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schools to teach "creation science," 198 or authorizing teachers to hold
one-minute voluntary prayer sessions. 199 The government imposes no
subtle requirement to go to church by merely protecting the right of
citizens to worship.
Though the question is closer, bans on picketing outside church
also appear to pass the second Lemon prong, the current endorsement
test. In Corporationof the PresidingBishop v. Amos,2 00 the Court wrote:
"A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence." 20 ' In the case of an Olmer-style ordinance, it is not fair to say
that the city government itself is advancing religion because the ordinance only makes it easier for churches to do so. A prohibition on the
picketing of churches has less effect on their ability to advance reli20 2
gion than the favorable tax treatment that churches already receive.
Forcing a protestor to put down a placard as he passes in front of a
church, though arguably an infringement on free speech, seems no
more of an imposition than forcing that same protestor to fund the
20 3
church indirectly through higher taxes.
Even so, one might assert that a ban on picketing outside
churches endorses religion when similar bans do not protect other
properties. The plaintiffs in Olmer presented a similar argument comparing the Lincoln ban to a town ordinance granting churches free
snow removal, which Barense v. Town of Barrington20 4 ruled unconstitutional. If a city cannot push snow away from a church, the plaintiffs
20 5
argued, it should not have the ability to push citizens away either.
The difference between snow and people, of course, is that the church
198

See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987).

199

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985).

483 U.S. 327 (1987).
Id. at 337.
See I.R-C. § 170 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (allowing tax deductions to certain taxpayers for donations to religious organizations); § 501(c) (3) (1994) (exempting from federal
income taxation certain organizations, including those "operated exclusively for religious
...
purposes").
203 For a good example of the argument that tax benefits for churches violate the
Constitution, see E.G. Lashbrooke, Jr., An Economic and ConstitutionalCasefor Repeal of the
LR.C. Section 170 Deductionfor CharitableContributionsto Religious Organizations,27 DuQ. L.
Rxv. 695, 715-20 (1989) (advocating the repeal of I.RGC. § 170 on constitutional grounds).
204 955 F. Supp. 151 (D.N.H. 1996).
205 The protestor plaintiffs in Olmer also argued that the Lincoln ordinance violated
200
201
202

the second Lemon prong because it granted governmental power to a church, thereby advancing religion. The plaintiffs compared the situation to that in Larkin v. Grendell'sDen,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), which struck down a Massachusetts statute giving religious institutions the power to veto certain liquor licenses. See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127. The Lincoln
ordinance, however, does not give churches power to halt specific demonstrations that
they choose to halt; the broad ban covers all picketing.
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easily could get rid of snow on its own. Only the government, however, can remove people from public property. Therefore, the government has a responsibility to prevent uses of public property that
interfere with the constitutional rights of others. Furthermore, legislators have targeted other sites where focused picketing might impinge on private lives and constitutional rights, such as abortion
clinics and residential areas.2 0 6 A reasonable person more likely will
view these regulations as responses to harassing picket lines rather
than endorsement of a particular way of life.
The third prong of the Lemon test, which proscribes "excessive
entanglements," involves "examining the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
the religious authority."20 7 In Agostini v. Felton,208 the Court treated
this prong as simply another aspect of the effect of a governmental
action.2 0 9 Either way, the test does not disrupt a church picketing ordinance. This test appears primarily to prohibit laws that would require the government to undertake "continuing state surveillance" 210
or "entangle the state in details of administration." 21 1 These picketing
bans require no state monitoring to determine whether certain conduct appears religious. The state would act only to remove focused
picketing from outside places of worship, a relatively simple task that
212
does not interfere with religious activity.
Representing further evidence that the Lemon test likely would
not stop a government from protecting the right to worship, the case
law does not appear to cite the Establishment Clause as a bar to the
various antifuneral picketing and worship-disturbance statutes in
2 13
place around the country.
3.

Protectinga Captive Audience

Closely related to the idea of "religious privacy," or privacy in general, is another potential governmental objective: the protection of a
captive audience who, like the home dwellers in Frisby, cannot retreat
from unwanted speech. In Olmer, the city argued that the state ought
See supra note 3; infra text accompanying notes 215-38.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
209
See id. at 223.
210 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
211
Id. at 615 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J.))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
212 Of course, this action moves the state into the messy landscape of defining church,
but such territory is not new to the government.
213 See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
206

207
208
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to be able to protect both a citizen's "religious home" and residential
14
home.2
Generally, "[t]he ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it
is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. '2 15
In an open, public location, the listener bears the burden of avoiding
offensive speech. 2 16 As the Supreme Court recognized in Frisby, however, listeners cannot always avoid speech. 217 The private residence in
Frisby is the prime example of a location where listeners can expect
their privacy to defeat an outsider's desire to communicate. The case
law is less clear, however, when 'addressing areas that lie beyond the
inherent sanctity of the home.
The Supreme Court first developed the captive audience idea to
protect residential areas from sound trucks blasting amplified advertisements. 21 8 Generally, a "captive audience" is one that cannot avoid
the objectionable speech. 2 19 Although the home is perhaps the best
example of an environment in which a captive audience may exist, the
Court has recognized that "[i]n today's complex society we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes" 2 20 and that the captive
audience doctrine may apply to locations outside the home.
Although that may be true, the Court has been reluctant to identify other specific places where the captive audience doctrine might
operate. 22 1 Besides people in their own homes, the Court has pointed
to school children as potential captives, especially in the context of
school prayer.2 22 In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,Inc., 2 23 the Court

also noted that "while targeted picketing of the home threatens the
psychological well-being of the 'captive' resident, targeted picketing of
a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the
physical, well-being of the patient held 'captive' by medical circum214 Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1102 (D. Neb. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, No. 98-4112NE, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct. 17,

1999).
215

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).

216

See id. at 21-22.

217 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
218 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). In banishing obnoxious sound trucks
from neighborhoods, the Court reasoned that people in the surrounding homes were
"practically helpless" to avoid the cacophonous din. Id.
219 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (holding that advertising inserts in customer bill envelopes do not implicate a captive audience
because the customers easily could dispose of the objectionable speech).
220 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
221 See Jessica M. Karner, Comment, PoliticalSpeech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. Rsv. 637, 669 (1995).
222 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
223 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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stance." 224 The Court seems to establish a tough test for captivity in

Cohen v. California,225 which held that the government may "prohibit
intrusion into the privacy of the home," but only when "substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable man227
ner."2 26 However, a few years later in Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,
the Court generalized that "each case ultimately must depend on its
own specific facts" and that speech restrictions may be permissible
"when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree
of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to
'22 8
avoid exposure.
The most prominent case that expands the captive audience doctrine outside the home is Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.2 2 9 The Lehman Court plurality decided that commuters in a city-owned and operated streetcar present a captive audience whom the government
can protect from certain types of advertising. 230 The plurality held
that the commuters rode the streetcar "as a matter of necessity, not of
choice" 23 ' and could not avoid viewing advertising placards. The plurality cited "the risk of imposing upon a captive audience." 23 2 Justice
Douglas, the fifth vote, stressed that "the right of the commuters to be
free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from
transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the
dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." 233 DissentingJustice Brennan, however, contended that riders easily could avert their
eyes to avoid the ads.23 4 Only a plurality of the Justices joined the lead
23 5
opinion.
Although some courts still refer to Lehman for the proposition
that captive audiences exist outside the home, 23 6 the Supreme Court
itself has noted that Lehman involves merely "the special interests of a
government in overseeing the use of its property" 237 and has limited
224

225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 768.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).

Id. at 21.

422 U.S. 205 (1975).
Id. at 209 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
418 U.S. 298 (1974).
230 See id. at 304 (Blackmun, J.).
231 Id. at 302 (Blackmun, J.) (quoting Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451,
468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232 Id. at 304 (Blackmun, J.).
233
Id. at 307. (Douglas, J., concurring).
234 See id at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235 See id at 299.
236 See, e.g., New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718,
722 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that welfare recipients waiting in a welfare office constitute a
captive audience); Resident Advisory Bd.v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383, 402 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(deciding that workers on ajobsite constitute a captive audience).
237 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
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its application. In fact, the Court seems outright reluctant to apply
the doctrine to many areas that appear to involve genuine captivity.
For instance, the Supreme Court has not ruled that employees at their
worksite form a captive audience.23 8 It makes little sense to reason
that commuters on a streetcar escape captivity once they arrive at
work, which necessitated the streetcar ride in the first place. Perhaps
the Supreme Court would rather forget about Lehman, and read the
language of Frisby as hinting that the doctrine may not apply outside
23 9

the home.

Where this stance leaves the application of the captive audience
doctrine to protests outside churches is uncertain. If the current
Supreme Court were to expand the captive audience doctrine beyond
the four walls of the home, churches present one of the strongest
cases.
First, churches potentially present a high degree of real captivity.
Many religions require or strongly encourage in-church worship on
specified days and at specified times. 2 40 The congregation and spiritual leader not only might look upon one's absence from church with
disfavor, but may even regard it as a punishable sin.241 For the true
believers of many religions, whether and where to attend church are
matters of less flexibility than virtually any other activity. When
protestors surround a house of worship, the faithful do not have the
option of avoidance. The unwilling listener simply must endure the
offensive speech.
Second, churches and homes share many similar characteristics.
As with homes, people go to churches voluntarily to exercise their
constitutional rights. Like homes, churches traditionally possess sanctity as a place of refuge where the weary might come for solace and
guidance. One Lincoln reverend stated in an Olmer defense affidavit
that "[p]art of our religion teaches our members that the Church is
their spiritual home, a sacred place, and a place to which they can
retreat to escape from the trials and tribulations of their daily pur-

See Karner, supra note 221, at 669.
See id.at 670. As the Frisby Court noted, "that we are often captives outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.., does not mean we must be
captives everywhere." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (omission in original)
(quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
240
See 3 TIE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 488 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987).
241
The Catechism of the Catholic Church,for instance, makes it clear that Sunday worship
is integral to the dictates of the Third Commandment, see Exodus 20:8-10, and quotes from
the Codex luris Canonic: "On Sundays and other holy days of obligation the faithful are
238
239

bound to participate in the Mass." CATvcHisM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 526 (1994) (quot-

ing 1983

CODE

c.1247) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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suits." 242 Many commentators agree that worship is a uniquely private
243
activity.

Nevertheless, the Olmer court refused to extend the Frisby captive
audience doctrine to churches, declaring that "[i] t is at best an imperfect analogy to suggest that adults and children attending church are
similar to the residents of a home."244 Courts may avoid this exten-

sion, because a liberal application of the doctrine potentially could
lead to overly excessive speech regulation. As the Supreme Court
often notes, people in modem society are captives in some way almost
every minute of the day, forced into certain places by the demands of
time, age, health, and socioeconomic status. 245 Besides the aforementioned schoolhouse, workplace, and doctor's office, several other
modem "prisons" may require one's presence despite the existence of
a picket-the welfare office, courthouse, drivers' license renewal office, and city hall. Depending on one's line of work or other factors,
one even might have to visit these places regularly. Yet, extending the
captive audience doctrine to each of these sites and many others we
might contemplate would intolerably limit free expression.
Of course, the application of the captive audience doctrine to
churches does not necessitate its extension everywhere. "Church" is
no easier to define than religion itself, but this conceptual ambiguity
does not prevent the government from giving churches special tax
treatmenL246 The analogy between churches and homes may be imperfect, as the Olmer court suggested, but it is conceivable that a different court could use this analogy as the basis for extending the captive
audience doctrine to church picketing.
C.

The Requirement of Ample Alternative Channels

Whether a particular ordinance restricting expression outside a
church leaves ample speech alternatives is a highly fact-specific question. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,247 the Supreme Court held that even

regulations merely shifting the time, place, or manner of expression
must leave ample alternative channels of communications. 248 The
fact that a speaker simply could communicate somewhere else is not
242 Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
at 11, Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. Neb. 1998) (No. 4:CV98-3311)
(alteration in original) (quoting affidavit of Rev. Lauren D. Ekdahl).
243

See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND CoM-

AMERCAN LIFE 219-49 (updated ed. 1996) (describing how many aspects of
religion in America are private).
244
Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
245 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
246 See I.RC. § 501(c) (3) (1994).
247 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
248 See id at 56.
TffrmENT IN
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enough to satisfy the ample alternatives element. 24 9 The requirement
seeks to ensure that speech restrictions do not "ha[ve] the effect of
entirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience
with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate." 2 50 In
other words, a speaker's right to convey a message to certain groups
must receive protection along with the message itself.
While cases such as United States v. Grace251 address the constitu-

252 the
tional protection of signs and banners on public sidewalks,
Court considers a wide range of leaflets, actual speech, and more indi25 3
vidualized methods of communication to be "ample alternatives."
For example, the St. David'scourt touched only briefly on the alternative channels requirement, noting that Westboro made no showing
that alternative avenues left untouched by the injunction, such as
handing out leaflets, engaging in limited picketing, picketing elsewhere, or using mailings, would give the defendant "insufficient other
254
means to communicate its message."
The Lincoln ordinance forced protestors to move their placards
across the street, but allowed them to distribute leaflets on the sidewalk directly in front of the church. 25 5 Protestors also could speak to
churchgoers from the sidewalk, as long as this speech did not trigger
disturbance-of-the-peace laws. 256 The Olmer court's opinion granting
a preliminary injunction against the Lincoln ordinance does not
reach the issue of ample alternative channels. 257 The court indicated,
however, that because the church adjoins a busy, four-lane roadway, a
prohibition on signs removes any reasonable means for demonstrators
249 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[O]ne is not to have the exercise
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.").
250 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Court seems to go even further in cases such as Gilleo, in which it found a restriction
unconstitutional because, among other reasons, alternative channels of communication
would not reach the intended audience "nearly as well." Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 57.
251
461 U.S. 171 (1983).
252 See id. at 183-84 (striking down a statute prohibiting the display of flags -orbanners
on the grounds of the Supreme Court building).
253 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)
(upholding a ban on sleeping in a park against protestors seeking to bring attention to
homelessness because the protestors still could communicate their message in ways such as
what the dissent calls "feigned sleeping"); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (upholding a state rule mandating that the
sale or distribution of merchandise on a fairground take place in specific, fixed locations).
254 St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821, 832
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
255 See Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095 (D. Neb. 1998), affd, No.
98-4112NE, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1999).
256 See id,
257 The court found that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest in question and thus declined to examine this issue in detail. See id. at
1103.
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to communicate from the sidewalks around the church to passing motorists.2 58 Furthermore, according to the court the application of the

same rule to a church such as St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City
would bar protest from a large area during fifty-three masses each
2 59
week.
Although demonstrators certainly could not distribute leaflets to
motorists speeding past the church, nothing in the Lincoln ordinance
prevents pickets just outside the specified church area. Presumably,
drivers would see signs on an adjacent block as easily as they would see
those in front of the church. So long as churches were dispersed
within the community, there would be plenty of sidewalk space for
protestors to picket under the potential observation of motorists. As
for the target audience itself, the O/mer ordinance gives demonstrators
ample alternative methods of communicating their message either
from across the street with placards or on the church sidewalk with
leaflets and conversation.
D.

The Requirement of Narrow Tailoring

As stated above, courts prohibit restrictions on speech that are
"substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest"; 260 in the case of injunctions, restrictions must "burden no

more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. "261 The St. David'scourt failed to reach this issue in depth, considering the facts insufficient to judge whether the buffer zone in
question was overbroad.2 62 Articulating the need for an evidentiary
hearing, it concluded that buffer zone injunction cases involve too
many unique facts simply to rely on holdings from other courts re2 63
garding the appropriate size and shape of the buffer zone.

The ordinance at issue in Olmer prohibited all signs on public
property within fifty feet of religious premises during specified times
before, during, and after services. 264 As the Olmer court pointed out,
this language not only prohibits disruptive protests, but also bans a
person "from passively holding a sign or banner that does not frighten
children in any way"; 2 65 it would outlaw "a Catholic priest ...displaying to his willing flock on the cathedral sidewalk shortly before mass a
258

See id.

259

See id&

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).
262 See St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821,
832 (Kan.Ct. App. 1996).
260
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Se id.
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See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
[d. at 1101.
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sign that states: 'Abortion is Wrong.' 2 66 Yet, the ordinance would not
stop protestors from handing children graphic pictures of aborted fetuses.2 67 The Olmer court concluded that the ordinance therefore
failed in two respects: it "bans speech that is harmless to very young
children, yet potentially significant to adults, while failing to prohibit
other speech ...

268
that may terrorize a child."

Although one might argue that parents can keep their children
away more easily from offensive leaflets than from large placards, it is
indisputable that the Olmer ordinance burdens a substantial amount
of harmless and even desirable speech. The situation highlights a
problem that many city councils have to face when trying to grapple
with this issue: an attempt to pass an all-inclusive ordinance to avoid
being labeled a content-based restriction will run headlong into the
narrow-tailoring requirement. City leaders in Olmer contended that
they simply did the best they could, 269 but the court countered with
two arguments of its own.
First, according to the court, the goal of protecting children may
excuse a content-based restriction. 270 Thus, a city may have the power
to ban only gruesome signs and communication that might scare children without burdening other speech. Secondly, the Olmer court reasoned that a more limited buffer zone, such as that upheld in
Edwards,2 7 ' could shield children from the pictures while allowing
demonstrations on most of the sidewalk outside the church. 27 2 As this
Note discussed earlier,27 3 however, Edwards involves only an eight-foot
buffer zone around church entrances. Such a narrow picket-free
space likely would not protect children from offensive signs.
Although this small buffer zone does not serve a governmental interest, the reference to Edwards shows that some type of buffer zone
might be found constitutional, so long as it meets the court's objections regarding overbreadth.
The extension of Frisby's narrow tailoring rationale likely would
not assuage court's concerns with broad ordinances. The Frisby Court
noted that complete bans still might be narrowly tailored "if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted
266

Id.

267

See id&

268

Id

Seei& at 1102.
See id. at 1100 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[W]e have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials.")).
271
See Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1998) (per
269
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curiam).
272
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See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03.
See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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evil." 274 In other words, such a complete prohibition may be necessary when "the medium of expression itself" creates the evil. 275 In the

case of residential picketing, the Frisby Court held that targeting a captive audience in a home is such an "offensive and disturbing... form
of... communication" that it becomes an evil worthy of a complete
2 76
yet narrowly tailored ban.

Although the captive audience doctrine speaks to the issue of the
government's permissible interest in protecting residential (or
church) privacy, in this context the doctrine seems to work more like
the secondary effects doctrine; 2 77 the secondary effects doctrine allows
the banishment of some evil to save an otherwise content-specific or
overbroad ordinance from unconstitutionality. The question becomes whether focused picketing around a church is so offensive and
disturbing as to constitute an evil that must be rooted out even if desirable communication is destroyed along the way.
The Ohner court apparently thought not, and ample reasons exist
to support that conclusion. The language of Frisby specifically addresses residential listeners and seems to tap directly into the home-ascastle idea, stating that even a solitary picketer could "invade residential privacy" like a "stranger" who "lurks outside." 2 78 A change in facts,
the Court says, might prompt a different outcome-for instance,
2
when someone's home provides the forum for a public meeting.

79

Even if the Frisby opinion does encompass a wider variety of venues, it
does not seem prudent to allow the government to label so easily entire classes of speech evil and thus eliminate the good speech with the
bad.
Although one can argue for its application, the secondary effects
doctrine itself also fails to save church picketing bans for similar reasons. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,28 0 the Supreme Court
announced the idea of secondary effects in upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within 1000
feet of a church, park, school, or residential zone.2 8 ' Although the
ordinance appeared content-based on its face, the Court concluded
instead that it was content-neutral because the government's
"'predominate concerns' were with the secondary effects of adult theaFrisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
d at 486 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 810 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276 Id. at 487.
See supra text accompanying notes 263-68.
277
278 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
274
275

279
280
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See ia at 488.

475 U.S. 41 (1986).
at 47.
See id.

306

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:271

ters," such as increased crime and lower property values, rather than
with the theaters themselves. 28 2 Even though the ban eliminated
adult establishments from ninety-five percent of the city,283 the Court
held that reasonable alternative channels for the communication
2 84
remained.
Although the Court has never addressed Renton's applicability to
non-sexually explicit communication, a plurality in Boos v. Banri 8 5 ap28 6
peared to extend the secondary effects doctrine to political speech.
Boos deals with a restriction on speech critical of foreign governments
outside their embassies. 28 7 While a majority of the Court found the
restriction unconstitutional, 288 at least six Justices may have thought
that analysis under the secondary effects doctrine was relevant. 28 9
Some lower courts have shown greater reluctance to apply the
secondary effects doctrine to political speech, 290 and the landscape
remains hazy. The Third Circuit wrote in Rappa v. New Castle
County29 1 that it had "some doubts" about extending the doctrine and
struck down a Delaware law that exempted advertisements for local
cities, industries, and meetings from regulations banning all signs
within twenty-five feet of state highways. 292 The Rappa court noted in
its decision that a Supreme Court majority "has never explicitly applied the analysis to political speech." 2 93 However, in a case regarding

a Maine statute that prevented door-to-door solicitation by police officers, the First Circuit mentioned that the law might be content-neutral because it sought to prevent secondary effects such as implied
294
coercion.
In the context of residential picketing, at least a few courts have
combined Frisby and Renton to devise a rationale that allows some pickets but not others. The Rhode Island Supreme Court cited Frisby and
Renton in upholding an antipicketing ordinance that had been passed
in reaction to abortion protests and excepted from prohibition pro282
283
284
285
286

I

See id.at 64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See ia at 50.
485 U.S. 312 (1988).
See id. at 321 (O'Connor, J.).
287 See id. at 315.
288 See id. at 329.
289 See Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 615, 633 (1991).

290 See David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms," 37 WAsHBuRN L.J. 55, 93 (1997).
291 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994).
292 See id. at 1069.
293

1&

294 See Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 893 n.9 (1st Cir. 1993). The
court mentioned this idea only in a footnote, because neither litigant raised the argument.
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tests related to activities inside a residence. 295 Mentioning Renton, a
New Jersey court in Murray v. Lawson2 96 allowed an injunction to

stand, even though it had the effect of prohibiting a particular group
of anti-abortion demonstrators from picketing in front of a doctor's
residence. 29 7 Similarly, in Valenzuela v. Aquino,298 a Texas court found
that an injunction dealing with the secondary effects of picketing did
2 99
not violate the content-neutrality requirement.
Courts are less likely to embrace Renton as a rationale outside the
context of focused residential picketing. For example, the District of
Columbia Circuit did not accept as a constitutional secondary effect
300
"the threat of listeners' violent reaction" to a Ku Klux Klan march.
The court pointed to Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,3 0 ' which
held that "[1] isteners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis
for regulation."30 2 Secondary effects of the type discussed in Renton,
303
the court said, do not relate to the expressive activity itself.
Although some precedent exists to support a secondary effects
defense for picketing regulations, the generally lukewarm court reaction indicates that this doctrine might not justify a restriction like the
Lincoln ordinance in Olmer. After all, judges have good reason to
limit any new applications of the doctrine. Would-be censors are
quick to invoke the secondary effects doctrine in their attempt to secure for their cause the far less rigorous scrutiny of content-neutrality.3 0 4 Without a bright-line limitation, such as the original Renton
zoning control of adult businesses, this expansive doctrine could subsume virtually every form of expression.

295

See Town of Barrington v. Blake, 568 A.2d 1015, 1019-20 (LI. 1990).

296

624 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), affd as modfled, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J.

1994).
297 See id.at 13.
298 800 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), affd in part and rev'd in par4 853 S.W.2d 512
(Tex. 1993).
299 See id. at 305.
300 Christian Knights v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
301 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
302 Id. at 134.
303 See ChristianKnights, 972 F.2d at 373.
304 See, e.g., Christopher M. Kelly, Note, "The Spectre of a 'Wired' Nation": Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC and lust Amendment Analysis in Cyberspace, 10 HARv.J.L. & TEcH. 559, 637 (1997) (suggesting that the so-called "V-chip" television device could be constitutional because it would prevent the secondary effects);
William L. Mitchell, II, Comment, "Secondary Effects" Analysis: A Balanced Approach to the
Problem of Prohibitions on Aggressive Panhandling,24 U. BALT. L. REv. 291, 322-23 (1995)
(arguing that the secondary effects doctrine could apply to the battle against "aggressive
panhandling").
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V
CONSTRUCUING A CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON
CHURCH PICKETING

Preceding sections of this Note discussed the inadequacies of specific case law surrounding bans on communication outside churches,
but reasoned that standard time, place, and manner analysis generally
could apply. Part IV.A demonstrated that the requirement of content
neutrality presents no problems for such broad ordinances. Part IV.B
argued that the protection of children (as in the Olmer decision) and
the protection of "religious privacy"-if it does not violate the Establishment Clause-represent the most credible governmental interests
at stake in these ordinances. As Part IV.C showed, the requirement of
ample alternative channels for communication presents no barrier to
these ordinances, depending on the specific language in question.
Perhaps the most difficult requirement for local governments to meet
in drafting such an ordinance is that of narrow tailoring, as Part IV.D
pointed out.
A.

Traditional Narrowly Tailored Schemes Appear Either
Ineffective or Undesirable

With the demise of the Lincoln restriction in Olmer, the question
remains whether any such ban can be written to meet the concerns
outlined by the Olmer court, and if so, whether the result would be
constitutionally desirable. The answer is probably no on both counts.
Before deciding whether a restriction is narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest, one must first specify that interest.
In Olme, the court and the authors of the ordinance appeared to focus on the protection of children, as discussed above. After making
this determination, the Olmer court easily refuted the city's rationale
by stating obvious ways in which the ordinance was both over- and
underinclusive.3 0 5 Attacking the problem from either of these angles
only exacerbates the deficiencies on the other side of the equation.
An ordinance that makes communication restrictions within the
buffer zone more absolute risks violating the ample-alternatives requirement. Changing the restriction so that it covers less speech or a
smaller geographical area erodes any protection of children the government may have hoped to create.
As the Olmer court suggested, it may be possible to abandon the
goal of content neutrality and ban only those images that would offend children. However, the ubiquity of children presents a problem.
The tactic of "protecting children" plays to adults' sympathies, but po305 See Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1101 (D. Neb. 1998), aff'd, No.
98-4112NE, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 25528 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 1999).
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tentially leaves everyone else with fewer opportunities to contribute to
the marketplace of ideas. Even narrowly tailored restrictions, if applicable to all the environments in which one is likely to encounter children, quickly could result in a narrowing of speech everywhere. The
Olmer court cited Reno v. ACLUP0 6 for the proposition that the govern-

30 7
ment has an interest in protecting children from harmful materials,
but that case addresses communication delivered to private homes,
30 8
not communication encountered on a public sidewalk.
Other governmental interests mentioned earlier in this Note
hold several advantages over the protection of children. Protecting
religious privacy or captive audiences entering churches allow restrictions through the use of content-neutral language. However,
problems remain. If protecting religious privacy or the right of individuals to worship as they please constitutes the government's primary
interest, practicality requires one eventually to revisit the issue of protecting children. Nothing about the relatively peaceful picketing in
Olmer deters adults from attending a church except for the protest's
potentially detrimental effect on their children.
The language of the captive audience doctrine, on the other
hand, is more expansive, focusing on the psychological effect that
even a solitary, peaceful picketer can create.3 0 9 Although this expansiveness apparently fits the bill for banning picketing outside
churches, that same characteristic makes extending the doctrine undesirable. One could argue that churches fundamentally differ from
other places that hold captive audiences, but enough similarities exist
that the recognition of nonresidential captivity could allow unwanted
camel noses under the free speech tent.

B. An Alternative? Preventing Coercion
A better way to protect both churchgoers and First Amendment
values focuses on the true heart of the matter: coercion. Targeted
protesting can cause audience members to adopt outwardly a different viewpoint on some public issue, not because of the idea's merit,
but because of the coercive pressure the protest itself creates. 3 1 0 In
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-53. It is also worth noting that the Court struck down the
legislation in question despite concerns about protecting children. See id. at 875.
309 See supra Part IV.B.3.
310 See Anne D. Lederman, Comment, Free Choice and the FirstAmendment or Would You
Read This If I Held It in Your Face and Refused to Leave?, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1287, 1299
(1995). Lederman examined Supreme Court cases involving targeted protests in the labor
relations, abortion clinic, schoolhouse, and courthouse settings. See id. at 1299-1321. She
concluded that while regulating speech according to its coercive value seems to violate the
First Amendment, the Court seemed willing to accept coerciveness as a valid factor when it
306
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the case of focused picketing around a church, coercion obviously
exists when members of the congregation must alter or abandon the
way in which they treat their constitutional rights.
In his Frisbydissent, Justice Brennan argued that certain activities
related in the record of the case, such as the large number of protestors, the shouting and name calling, the trespassing, and the blocking
of exits, seemed coercive. 311 Brennan termed these examples "intrusive and coercive abuses" 312 of free speech rights and stated that the
government can neutralize such abuses through restrictions. "It is the
intrusion of speech into the home or the unduly coercive nature of a
particular manner of speech around the home that is subject to more
exacting regulation."3 1 Justice Brennan argued that a regulation is
not narrowly tailored under Vincent, if it could be written to eliminate
coercive elements of the expression without completely banning the
picketing.3 14 His dissent contended that a government can constitutionally regulate the number of picketers, the hours of picketing, and
the noise level, thereby "neutraliz[ing] the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects of picketing around the home,"3 15 yet leaving room for
free speech.
The captive audience theory accepts the idea of protecting the
targets of protests from the coercive speech. For Justice Brennan,
however, the Fisby majority went too far by allowing the notion that a
solitary demonstrator-the lurking stranger-induces a psychological
and thus coercive reaction.3 16 This weakness of the captive audience
doctrine-the blind notion that any home-bound captive audience
faces coercion regardless of a protest's characteristics-is perhaps why
courts refuse to extend it beyond homes. The standard captive audience theory simply encompasses too much behavior, concentrating on
the status of the audience and assuming the effect.
Whether coercion actually occurs logically depends on the nature
of both the protest and the audience. In many environments, it would
seem to take more than the solitary picketer to produce any sort of
undue coercion. For example, it is doubtful that the hapless defendant in Hogan looking to "up [his] ante" of Christians coerced anyone, even if his conduct had fallen under the court's definition of
"focused picketing. 3 17 On the other hand, the various affidavits and
invades "the target's privacy interests in retaining free choice in matters related to the

protesters' activity." Id. at 1322.
311
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 494 (1998) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
312 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313 Id at 492-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314
See i& at 493-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
315 IM. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
316 See id. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
317 City of Prairie Village v. Hogan, 855 P.2d 949, 951 (Kan. 1993).
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public statements of parents in the Olmer case demonstrate that larger
groups are better at coercing children and thereby parents. According to Justice Brennan, a "carefully crafted ordinance" should eliminate the coercive aspects of such pickets without eliminating free
318
speech altogether.
It is probably true that a permissible restriction designed to stop
such coercion may look like the regulation that the Olmer court envisioned when imagining a more narrowly tailored ordinance. Given
the fact that children succumb to coercion much more easily than
adults, in the end a ban with the stated goal of stopping coercion may
look like a ban with the goal of "protecting children," but with one
important difference: the basis of the restriction would not rest upon
the problematic justification of protecting children everywhere, protecting all captive audiences, or eliminating all-pervasive secondary effects. Most importantly, this shift in focus at least would require
plaintiffs to make a showing that someone faces coercion from demonstrators. This probably would not be possible, for instance, if the
protestors in Olmer merely handed graphic leaflets to adults and did
not communicate with children.
A coercion doctrine could run into expansiveness problems of its
own. For example, parading demonstrators could be said to coerce
pedestrians from crossing the street at a particular corner. Abortion
protestors carrying graphic signs outside a doctor's favorite barber
shop could frighten children, requiring parents to find another hairstylist. These cases are distinguishable, however, because they do not
involve the same type of constitutional rights as Olmer. There is a difference between conduct that forces others to abandon or to significantly alter the way in which they exercise constitutional religious
rights and the unavoidable aspects of living in a community alongside
people with whom you may disagree. 3 19 Any potential balancing test
would have to measure the constitutional importance of the implicated rights.
The coercion doctrine thatJustice Brennan described in his Frisby
dissent therefore provides an alternative rationale for banning exactly
what the city in Olmerwanted to restrict without overburdening protestors' free speech rights. The resulting ordinance still must be narrowly tailored to meet the goal of reducing coercion and further
protecting constitutional expression. In a time when demonstrators
mount often-harassing pickets in attempts to persuade others to
Fisby, 487 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Another idea is to restrict picketing to the site of the activity under protest, but this
argument does not resolve the issue. Protestors could claim that they are not picketing a
doctor in a church, but rather they are protesting that the church allows such a person
within its walls. Thus, any site could become the site of an activity under protest.
318
319
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change their viewpoint, focusing on the true evil-coercion-would
provide effective protection for the rights of citizens on either side of
the picket line. Curtailing coercion would serve society better than
either governmental inaction when the speech fails to fall within existing categories, or governmental overstepping should a court
broaden existing doctrines.
CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of focused protesting wherever a doctor who
performs abortions travels in the community is great enough that the
tactic is not likely to disappear. Even if such protests cause no social
change, they generate publicity as witnessed in both Olmer and St.
David's.320 As legislatures attempt to solve the problems that arise
when one form of expression, such as picketing, infringes on other
forms of expression, courts must balance carefully the opposing First
Amendment freedoms. This wariness is apparent in the Olmer decision, where the court discussed problems with the city ordinance
under the current doctrine. The court in St. David's, on the other
hand, was perhaps too quick to agree that the injunction under review
could constitute a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.
However, neither solution is satisfactory. Rather than an outcome-determinative forum analysis, a more flexible analysis based on the ideas
of coercion, as expressed by justice Brennan in Frisby,would lend itself
to a careful weighing of the constitutional interests involved in these
questions while continuing to protect vigorously the freedom of
speech.

320 On a regular basis Fred Phelps (no relation to the author), the leader of the
Westboro Baptist Church, captures the national media spotlight with his protests outside of
churches. A search in LEXIS's News Group File, Most Recent Two Years for the names Fred
Phelps and Westboro generates more than 100 hits from newspapers and magazines across
the country. All too often, the press focuses on the sensational activities of fringe groups
that express extreme points of view, potentially misleading the public in their perceptions
of what constitutes acceptable behavior. Groups such as the Westboro Baptist Church
thrive on publicity, good or bad, and cameras that turn toward their expressions of hatred
only fuel their conduct. As one weary newspaper in Phelps's home state of Kansas put it:
"Over the years, we have grown tired of editorializing against the nauseating, hateful tirades of Fred Phelps. Criticism does not deter Phelps; in fact, it seems to invigorate him."
Perry Young, A Tale of Two Phelpses, AsHEVLLE CITzEN-TIMES (Asheville, N.C.), Dec. 11,

1998, at A10 (quoting Ottawa Heraldof Ottawa, Kansas).

